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A recent issue of this journal contained an article that canvassed
state laws that added to the basic requirements of the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)1 for due process hearings
(DPHs).2 The specific focus of that article was the hearing stage,
including the rights of the parties and the authority of the impartial
hearing officer (IHO)3 at the hearing. Although the boundaries for
the hearing stage are more blurry than bright,4 the article excluded
and recommended for subsequent analyses the prehearing and posthearing stages.5
The purpose of this follow-up analysis is to supplement the
earlier article by canvassing state law provisions specific to the posthearing stage of IDEA DPHs. The length is relatively brief because
(1) the springboard article on the hearing stage provided the detailed
foundation, (2) the scope of the post-hearing stage is much more
limited, and (3) the previous literature has largely unexplored this
stage.6 Otherwise in accordance with the format of the original
* Perry A. Zirkel is University Professor Emeritus of Education and Law at
Lehigh University.
1 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1419 (2017). The IDEA regulations provide the
remainder of the requirements for due process hearings as the federal foundation
subject to state elaboration. 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.507–300.515 (2018).
2 Perry A. Zirkel, State Laws for Due Process Hearings under the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act, 38 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 1 (2018).
3 This article uses the generic label of IHO, although an increasing proportion
of states have moved to using administrative law judges (ALJs) for this role, a
more than negligible number continue to use part-time contractors who are either
attorneys or, less frequently, special education specialists. E.g., Jennifer F. Collins,
Perry A. Zirkel & Thomas A. Mayes, State Due Process Hearing Systems: An
Update, 30 J. DISABILITY POL’Y STUD. 156 (2019) (reporting that twenty states
used central panel ALJs compared to twelve states a decade earlier).
4 For an example of the overlap between the hearing and post-hearing stages,
the IDEA’s “stay put” provision requires keeping the child in the “current
educational placement” starting with the filing for the hearing until the completion
of the proceedings, including any judicial appeals. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j) (2017); 34
C.F.R. § 300.518 (2018). Exemplifying the other, porous end of the post-hearing
stage, the scope extends on a limited, transitional basis to the right to judicial
appeal, for which the parties have the option of either state or federal court,
including detailed provisions for attorneys’ fees. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i) (2017); 34
C.F.R. §§ 300.516–300.517 (2018).
5 Zirkel, supra note 2, at 28.
6 The occasional scholarly commentary has been limited to the case law for
specific substeps of the post-hearing stage of DPHs, such as the standard of review
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article, Part I provides the template of IDEA requirements for the
post-hearing stage. Part II tabulates the state law provisions that
supplement the federal template. Part III provides a discussion of the
results along with recommendations for future policymaking and
scholarship.
I. IDEA FOUNDATIONAL REQUIREMENTS
The IDEA contains specific provisions for the successive stages
before, during, and after DPHs.7 The specific focus here is the after,
or the post-hearing stage. As a prefatory matter, two features of this
stage illustrate the IDEA’s model of “cooperative federalism.” 8 First,
for appeals of DPH decisions, the IDEA provides states with the
option to have a second, review officer tier prior to judicial review. 9
Second, for judicial appeals, the IDEA expressly provides for
concurrent state and federal court jurisdiction, 10 with states having
the option for a different limitations period than the otherwise
specified ninety-day period.11 For the remaining state variations, the
for the second tier or for the courts. E.g., Daniel W. Morton-Bentley, The Rowley
Enigma: How Much Weight Is Due to IDEA Administrative Proceedings in Federal
Court?, 36 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 428 (2016) (proposing judicial
deference to substantive, not procedural, findings of IHOs); Perry A. Zirkel, The
Standard of Review Applicable to Pennsylvania’s Special Education Appeals
Panel, 3 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 871 (1994) (proposing a three-part paradigm for the
review standard for the review officer tier under the IDEA).
7 For the basic IDEA substeps of each stage as the introduction for an analysis
of the state law provisions at the middle stage, see Zirkel, supra note 2, at 7–8.
8 Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 52 (2005) (citing Little Rock
Sch. Dist. v. Mauney, 183 F.3d 816, 830 (9th Cir. 1999)).
9 20 U.S.C. § 1415(g) (2017). The number of states opting for a review officer
tier has decreased from twenty-six in 1991 to eight in 2019. Jennifer F. Connolly
et al., State Due Process Hearing Systems under the IDEA: An Update, 30 J.
DISABILITY POL’Y STUD. 156, 157–58 (2019) (identifying Kansas, Kentucky,
Nevada, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, and South Carolina); see also Lisa
Lukasik, Special-Education Litigation: An Empirical Analysis of North Carolina’s
First Tier, 118 W. VA. L. REV. 735, 745 n.38 (2016) (identifying Oklahoma as an
additional with a review officer tier). In such states, the IHO is at the local level.
20 U.S.C. § 1415(g)(1) (2017).
10 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A) (2017); 34 C.F.R. § 300.516(a) (2018) (providing
right of appeal to state or federal court).
11 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(B) (2017); 34 C.F.R. § 300.516(b) (2018). The
starting point for this period is the date of the DPH decision or, in two-tier states,
the review officer decision. Id.
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understanding is that they may add to, not subtract from, the
requirements for state and local education agencies.12
Although not demarcated by clear pre-established boundaries,13
the following provisions of the IDEA legislation, with the limited
supplementation of its regulations,14 set forth the foundational
template of the analysis of the state law additions15:
1. Decision
a. FAPE Limitations:
• Substantive Grounds16
• Two-Part Test for Procedural FAPE 17
• Authority for Procedural Compliance Order 18
b. Factual Findings19

E.g., Evans v. Evans, 818 F. Supp. 1215, 1223 (N.D. Ind. 1993) (“IDEA
does not preempt state law if the state standards meet the minimum federal
guidelines . . . [but it] ‘does preempt state law if the state standards are below the
federal minimum’” (citing Amelia Cty. Sch. Bd. v. Va. Bd. of Educ., 661 F. Supp.
889, 893–94 (E.D. Va. 1987)).
13 Supra note 4 and accompanying text.
14 The citations of the regulations are limited to those that provide
specifications beyond those of the legislation.
15 Similar to the predecessor analysis, this taxonomy is only an ad hoc
approximation. For example, the odd language for the contents of the IHO’s
decision led to a tentative interpretation that the document must include, at a
minimum, factual findings. Infra note 19. As a result, the template provides for an
accompanying subcategory for other contents that state laws may require.
Similarly, the bulleted items only exemplify rather than exhaust the subcategories;
the state law additions may be either to or beyond these examples.
16
20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(E)(i) (2017) (requiring that IHO decisions that
determine FAPE be based “on substantive grounds”).
17
20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(E)(ii) (2017) (requiring for procedural violations
three alternative options for denial of FAPE, such as “deprivation of educational
benefits”).
18 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(E)(iii) (2017) (permitting the IHO to order
procedural compliance).
19 20 U.S.C. § 1415(h)(4) (2017) (parties’ and public’s, including SEA
advisory committees, right to “findings of fact and decision”); cf. 20 U.S.C. §§
1415(g)(1), 1415(i)(2)(A) (2017) (right to appeal “findings and decision”).
12
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c. Other Required Contents
d. Specific Transmittals20
e. Publicly Available21
f. Final, Subject to Specified Appeal22
2. Appeal
a. To Second Tier23
• Impartial Review and Independent Decision 24
• Procedures and Standards25
• Timeline26
• Transmitted to Advisory Committee and Publicly
Available27
• Final, Subject to Judicial Review28
b. To Court29
• Limitations Period30

20 U.S.C. § 1415(h)(4) (2017) (to the parties); see also 20 U.S.C. §
1415(h)(4)(B) (2017) (from SEA, after redaction, to state advisory panel).
21 20 U.S.C. § 1415(h)(4)(A) (2017).
22
20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(1)(A) (2017). The further detail in IDEA regulations
include a length limit from filing to decision. Infra note 93 and accompanying text.
23
20 U.S.C. § 1415(g)(1) (2017). This tier is optional, with a dwindling
minority of states having selected it. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
24 20 U.S.C. § 1415(g)(2) (2017).
25 34 C.F.R. § 300.514(b)(2)(i)–(vi) (2018) (examine entire record, assure
procedural compliance, seek additional evidence if necessary, offer opportunity for
oral or written arguments, and copy to parties); see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.515(d)
(2018) (if oral arguments, at a time and place reasonably convenient to parents and
child).
26 34 C.F.R. § 300.515(b) (2018) (thirty-days plus extensions after filing date).
27 20 U.S.C. § 1415(h)(4) (2017).
28 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(1)(B) (2017).
29
20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A) (2017). This provision provides for both state and
federal court jurisdiction. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A) (2017); 34 C.F.R. §
300.516(a) (2018) (providing right of appeal to state or federal court).
20
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• Procedures/Standards (e.g., records, additional evidence,
quantum of proof, remedies)31
• Attorneys’ Fees32
3. Miscellaneous33
a. Stay Put34
b. Other35
II. METHOD AND RESULTS
The three sources were the same as in the predecessor analysis,
with the focus here being the provisions adding to the foregoing36
federal template: (1) state special education legislation and
regulations corollary to the IDEA; (2) state Administrative
Procedures Act (APA) legislation and regulations that appeared
applicable to IDEA DPHs;37 and (3) relevant state policy manuals

20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(B) (2017) (ninety-days unless state law specifies
otherwise).
31 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C) (2017).
32 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3) (2017).
33 The original draft of this category contained a subcategory for the
exhaustion provision. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l) (2017). However, it is not in this final
version because (1) it seems to be more a matter of prehearing due to its
prerequisite nature and, in any event, (2) none of the state laws provided any
specific addition to it.
34
20 U.S.C. § 1415(j) (2017) (except for limited specified circumstances, “the
child shall remain in the then-current educational placement” during the
proceedings); see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.518 (2018) (adding provisions for transition
from Part C to Part B and effect of decision agreeing with parents by the IHO or, in
two-tier states, by the review officer).
35 This catch-all is for various post-hearing stage additions in state laws that do
not fit in the previous two broad categories.
36 Supra notes 16–35 and accompanying text.
37 As with the predecessor analysis, the boundary was blurry for some of these
states and did not entirely coincide with the use of ALJs as IHOs. Zirkel, supra
note 2, at 11. In Virginia, for example, the state Supreme Court is the “home” for
the Virginia IHOs, who are contractual private attorneys. See HEARING OFFICER
SYSTEM RULES OF ADMIN. 1 (2016),
http://www.courts.state.va.us/programs/ho/rules_of_admin_1.pdf. The state’s
special education regulations expressly incorporate this court’s rules of
30
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that appeared to have the force of law.38 The Appendix lists the
citations of the post-hearing provisions of these state laws in two
columns, differentiating those state law specific to special education
from the generic APA provisions applicable to IDEA IHOs. 39
Conversely,40 the contents do not extend to other, more clearly
distinguishable related areas. 41
administration, which were revised in light of the state’s APA “hearing officer”
provision. See HEARING OFFICER DESKBOOK; A REFERENCE FOR VA. HEARING
OFFICERS 1 (2016), http://www.courts.state.va.us/programs/ho/deskbook.pdf.
However, I have excluded the related provisions of the APA based on the SEA’s
interpretation that they are inapplicable. E-mail from Patricia Haymes, Dir.,
Dispute Resolution & Admin. Servs., Va. Dep’t of Educ., to Perry A. Zirkel, Univ.
Professor Emeritus of Educ. & Law, Lehigh Univ. (Mar. 3, 2020, 12:54 EST) (“due
process hearings are not subject to the APA”) (on file with author).
38 IDAHO ADMIN. CODE r. 08.02.03.004 (2019) (incorporating by reference
DEP’T OF SPECIAL EDUC.: IDAHO SPECIAL EDUC. (2018),
https://www.sde.idaho.gov/sped/files/shared/Idaho-Special-Education-Manual2018-Final.pdf)); HEARING RULES FOR SPECIAL EDUC. APPEALS (2019),
www.mass.gov/anf/docs/dala/bsea/hearing-rules.doc. The basis for this
determination is MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 71B, § 2A(a) (2018) (authorizing the
director of the HOs unit, with specified consultation, to issue necessary procedural
rules consistent with applicable law); W. V A. CODE R. § 126-16-3 (2020)
(incorporating by reference W. VA. PROCEDURES MANUAL FOR THE EDUC. OF
STUDENTS WITH EXCEPTIONALITIES (2017),
http://wvde.state.wv.us/osp/Policy2419_2017.pdf); 7 W YO. CODE R. § 7 (2019)
(requiring the SEA to adopt “dispute resolution policies and/or procedures”
detailed in NOTICE OF PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES
EDUC. ACT (2015), https://edu.wyoming.gov/downloads/specialprograms/2016/procedural-safeguards.pdf). As also explained in the predecessor
analysis, this determination was not without close calls, and it is not clear that such
policy manuals comply with the IDEA regulation that requires an APA-type
rulemaking process in such cases. Zirkel, supra note 2, at 11 nn.53–56 (citing 34
C.F.R. § 300.165 (2018)).
39 The state’s row for either column or both is blank if the state’s legislation
and regulations lack a provision that adds to the post-hearing stage requirements of
the IDEA. For example, several states, including Colorado, Maryland, and
Missouri, have applicable APA laws that do not contain post-hearing provisions
that add to the federal template. See COLO. CODE REGS. § 301-8:2220R.6.02(7.5)(h) (2013); MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 8-413 (2018); MO. REV. STAT. §§
162.961 & 621.253 (2018).
40 I arrived at this framework for utility of the resulting information primarily
for IHOs, DPH participants, and policymakers.
41 These specific exclusions are: (1) the exhaustion provision; (2) the expedited
hearing provisions for disciplinary changes in placement; and (3) the standards for
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The Comments column contains supplemental information that
clarifies entries identified with letters cross-referencing their column.
Similar to the predecessor article,42 the Appendix provides two
citation columns that separate the state’s special education laws from
the applicable APA laws. However, the new table italicizes the APA
laws to distinguish them from the state’s special education laws.
Based on an examination of the aforementioned 43 sources, the
table contains entries that represent additions to the federal template,
with the rows being for each state and the columns corresponding to
the above mentioned template.44 Each entry is within the following
sequence: (x) = partial or indirect; x = without particular detail; x =
without particular detail but unusual; X = relatively detailed; and X =
relatively detailed and unusual.45 The Comments column contains
supplemental information that clarifies entries identified with letters
cross-referencing their column. Like the predecessor article, 46 the
Appendix provides two citation columns that separate the state’s
special education laws from the applicable APA laws. However, the
new table italicizes the APA laws to distinguish them from the states
special education laws.

tuition reimbursement. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii), 1415(l), 1415(k)(4)
(2017).
42 Zirkel, supra note 2, at 29–33.
43 Supra notes 37–38 and accompanying text.
44 Supra notes 16–35 and accompanying text.
45 This scale was a bit more differentiated that the model in the predecessor
analysis to make the unusual provisions more evident. Zirkel, supra note 2, at 14.
46 Id. at 29–33.
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E

F

G

I

Finality Subject to Appeal

Appeal

Public Availability

Specific Transmittals

Other Required Contents

Factual Findings

FAPE Limitations

Decision

H

Alabama

X

x

x

Alaska

x

x

(x)

x

x

J

K
Comments

Misc.

Other

D

Stay Put

C

To State or Federal Court

B

To Second, Optional Tier

SPRING 2020

x

(x)

x

Arizona*

x

X

Arkansas

x

x

(x)

x

x

x

x

California*

x

Colorado*

x

Connecticut**

X

Florida*

x

x

x

Delaware

(x)

x

x

x

x

(x)

(x)

capital letter=column
heading for referenced
entry; bold font= unusual
provisions; italics=APA
provisions
D-7 add'l items, incl. issues,
discussion of issues,
conclusions, exhibits list; Edecision and entire record to
SEA; I-30 days; K-SEA pays
D+E5-->advisory panel: I-state
superior ct.; J-extends to period
for appeal for evaluation,
services, placement or transfer;
K-LEA pays
C-with cited support; Dseparate legal conclusions w.
authority+rt. to appeal; E-to
party representatives+decision
and entire record to SEA; I-35
days; K-LEA pays OAH
C-supported by evidence+relied
upon in the decision; Dspecifications for orders; G-no
retention of jurisdiction or
reopening; K-IHO option of
posthearing brief within 7 days
B-cost is one mandatory factor
in placement cases; Dprevailing party per issue; Gcorrection procedure for minor
errors; K-permits decision by
settlement+clarifies
nonprecedential effect
D-rt. to appeal; E-to parties: not
personally identifiable for child
or parent+certified mail; to
SEA-decision and entire record
D-legal conclusions+order+may
include a comment on conduct
of the hearing and indicate
prevailing party per issue; I-45
days for state ct.; K-only allows
settlement agreements to be read
into the record+authorizes IHO
to prescribe alternate special
education program for the child+
SEA pays
D-legal conclusions+order+may
include a comment on conduct
of the hearing and indicate
prevailing party per issue; Konly allows settlement
agreements to be read into the
record+authorizes IHO to
prescribe alternate special
education program for the
child+SEA pays
D-specifications for
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D

E

F

G

Decision

H

I

Appeal

J
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K

Misc.

Comments
recommended order; I-state
circuit ct.; K-exceptions in
response to recommended
order+ party-proposed findings,
conclusions, and orders

x
x

Georgia*
Hawaii*

D-legal conclusions

x

Idaho*

X

Illinois

x

Indiana*

Iowa*

x

x

X

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

(x)

Kentucky*

x

x

(x)

x

Louisiana*

(x)

(x)

x

x

K-SEA enforcement

x

C-sufficient to convey basis for
the decision; G-authorizes IHO
to reopen the record upon notice
to the parties before issuing
decision; K-SEA pays and
enforces+specifications for IHO
record

x

D-issue-by-issue determination,
with reasons+rt. to appeal; E-to
parties' representatives; Gauthorizes IHO to reconvene
hearing before decision but no
reopening or reconsideration
after decision; K-authorizes IHO
enforcement proceeding+ IHO

x

Maryland*

Massachusetts*

x

x

Kansas

Maine

x

X

x

(x)

D-legal conclusions; G-motion
for reconsideration
G-motions for reconsideration
or clarification; I-28 days (w.
variations for
reconsideration)+order
implemented by 14th day unless
specified otherwise or appealed;
K-LEA pays and SEA sets IHO
rates
D-legal conclusions+
specifications for order; E-to
parties-translated into parents'
primary language if not
English+to their representatives,
SEA, and LEA sp. ed. director;
G-clarification procedure; I-120
days+ attorneys' fees for
parents if detrimental willful
disregard by LEA; J-60-day
nonliability?
C-solely on and with substantial
and reliable evidence; D-legal
conclusions+order/remedy+
notice of appeal and for
attorneys' fees within 30 days;
G-correction procedure for
minor errors; I-30 days
B-basis limitation extends to
"policies of the department"; Dseparate legal conclusions
D-legal conclusions; E-to parties
within 24 hrs+to SEA; H-30-day
filing period+20 days for
decision+transmittal to state bd.
of ed.; I-30 days; K-LEA pays
(both tiers)
D-separate legal conclusions if
different from recommended
order, which requires
conclusions+order+rt. to appeal;
H-no express extension
provision; I-30 days for state ct.

J-120 days

SPRING 2020

B

C

D

E

F

G

Decision

x

Michigan

Minnesota*

(x)

I

Appeal

x

X

H

x

Nevada

New
Hampshire**

New Jersey*
New Mexico

K

Misc.

(x)

x

x

x

x

x
x

x

x

x

x

Montana

Nebraska

J

x

Mississippi
Missouri*
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x

X

x

x

(x)

x

x

x

x

x

X

x

x

x

x

x

Comments
discretion for closing arguments
and, if written, length
limit+APA w. preemption
C-solely on and with supporting
evidence; D-separate legal
conclusions with supporting
authority or reasoning; Grequest for reconsideration+
IHO authority for rehearing
before decision; I-state ct.; LAPA w. preemption
B-comp. ed. if loss of benefit;
D-"or order" w. legal
conclusions within specified
scope of legal basis+rt. to
appeal; E-record to SEA within
one week; G-IHO authority to
correct clerical or mathematical
errors; I-60 days; K-consent
order if labelled as such+SEA
enforcement
K-rates and detailed scope of
IHO compensation
C-separate+aligned with order;
D-legal conclusions; E-to SEA;
K-IDEA preemption+special
state fund for ALJ hearings in
IDEA cases
K-authorizes SEA to replace
IHO if decision not issued
within 90 days+authorizes IHO
remedial authority for
reimbursement+SEA pays
administrative costs, incl. IHO
C-defined as conclusions for
each issue of fact; D-3 cover
items+jurisdictional
statement+legal conclusions+
order; E-to SEA with record; I-2
years for state ct.; Kenforcement via state court
within 1 year
C-decision based solely on
evidence at the hearing; H-30
days for filing w. 10 days for
any cross-appeal; K-LEA pays
via impartial method
C-including concise support; Dseparate legal conclusions; Iprovision for expert witness
fees+120 days for attorneys' fees
or expert witness fees; K-full
implementation within 30 days
unless appealed
D-12 add'l items, including
jurisdictional statement, which
need not be separate; F-via
SEA website database
G-corrections of clerical errors
or omissions at any time until
judicial appeal; K-LEA pays
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B

C

D

E

F

G

Decision

New York

x

X

North
Carolina*

X

North
Dakota*

(x)

H

I

Appeal

x

X

x

x

Misc.

x

x

x

x

Comments
C-with citations to the record;
D-identification of items of the
record, including specified
exhibit list+rt. of appeal; Erecord to LEA; H-40 days for
filing+detailed procedures; I-4
months; K-SEA must establish
maximum rates for IHO
compensation+ authorizes
consent order unless based on
other issues
D-legal conclusions+rt. of
appeal with deadline (+more
detailed list with conflicting
notice re rt. of appeal); H-30
days for filing; I-30 days if state
ct.
D-legal conclusions indirectly
(final v. proposed); G-limited rt.
for reopening before issuance of
decision; K- authorizes IHO to
direct parties to submit
proposed factual findings, legal
conclusions, and briefs
H-in 45 days; K-LEA pays
within SEA-established max.
rate and 50-hour hearing limit
unless IHO written rationale for
exceeding it

x

Oklahoma

X

Oregon*

(x)

x

South
Dakota*

x

x

Tennessee*

x

X

Pennsylvania

K

x

(x)

Ohio

J

40-1

x

x

Rhode Island
South
Carolina

x

x

x

x

D-9 add'l items, including
caption and issues; Greconsideration; L-specific
reference to customizing
preemption in applying APA
C-decision based solely on
"substantial evidence" at the
hearing; D-legal conclusions+
discussion
[no relevant additions to IDEA
regs]
[no relevant additions to IDEA
regs in state law, although
deadline for judicial appeal in
state guidelines]
C-with supporting evidence; Dseparate legal conclusions; I-30
days for state ct.
C-including determination re
meaningful parent
participation+supporting
evidence; D-legal conclusions
+prevailing party per issue+
reasons+remedy+procedure for
reconsideration+rt.of appeal; Fpublished via SEA website; Greconsideration; K-authorizes
IHO to allow parties to propose
factual findings, legal
conclusions, and order+LEA
pays except for IHO
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B

C

D

E

F

G

Decision

x

Texas

H

I

Appeal

J

Comments

Misc.

x

x

K

x

x

Utah

I-30 days

Vermont

(x)

x

x

X

(x)

x

x

Virginia***

Washington*

x

x

x

x

West Virginia

Stay Put

To State or Federal
Court

To Second, Optional
Tier

Finality Subject to
Appeal

Public Availability

x
Specific Transmittals

Factual Findings

FAPE Limitations

Other Required
Contents

x

Wyoming

[no relevant additions to IDEA
regs]
D-"conclusions" only indirectly
(via removal provision); Greissuance for specified areas
of correction; I-180 days in
state ct.; K-recertification
provision re timely decisions,
appeal rts. & "controlling case
or statutory authority to
support the findings"+same
timely decision criterion for
removal
C-numbered+separately
identifying credibility findings;
D-5 add'l items incl. numbered
legal conclusions with citations
to leg. and regs; G-no
reconsideration (expressly
overriding APA)
[no relevant additions to IDEA
regs other than referring to
"findings of fact and decisions"]
C-based solely on the evidence
at the hearing; D-legal
conclusions; I-45 days for state
ct.; K-exclusion of APA
D-legal conclusions+order (incl.
any remedy); K-IHO discretion
to request briefs and proposed
factual findings and conclusions

Other

Wisconsin

C-based solely on evidence at
the hearing+at party's request,
whether opposing party
unreasonably protracted the
proceedings or whether parent's
attorney provided sufficient
complaint; D-separate legal
conclusions; J-exception for
IHO-ordered reimbursement for
past expenses; K-IHO option of
bench decision followed later
within the prescribed period by
written decision+IHO option of
posthearing briefs

3
16
33
10
3
17
6
21
3
32
Totals
* Designates states that have APA legislation or regulations that, in addition to special education-specific laws,
apply to IDEA due process hearings; however, the row for such states is blank when the APA provisions do not
account for any additions to the post-hearing stage.
** Designates the converse situation in which the state’s APA does not apply to IDEA due process hearings
generally, but a particular APA provision for the post-hearing stage is incorporated by cross-referencing in the
state’s special education law.
*** Designates special situation of incorporation of Supreme Court rules of administration, which the SEA
interprets as not incorporating the rest of the state's APA.
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A. Decision
In this category, the most frequent state law additions, without
differential weighting for the Likert-type level of the entries, were the
combined specifications for factual findings (n=16) and other
required contents (n=33). For factual findings,47 as the entries in the
Comments column show, the prevalent addition concerned
supporting evidence. The unusual provisions included Tennessee’s
requirement to include a determination “regarding meaningful
participation by the parent in the development of the . . . IEP.”48
Another was Texas’ provision for including, at the request of either
party, a determination of whether the other party unreasonably
protracted the proceedings, per the IDEA criteria for attorneys’
fees.49 Unusual too were Washington’s APA formalities, including
numbering the findings and identifying those based on credibility. 50
For other required contents, the prevalent addition was for legal
conclusions (n=25). The unusual provisions consisted of either
highly detailed specifications (e.g., Alabama, New Jersey, and
Oregon) or peculiar particularities, such as consolidation with
Section 504 issues51 or designation of prevailing party status for
attorneys’ fees.52
Another relatively frequent subcategory (n=17) was for state law
additions to the finality of the decision subject to its judicial appeal. 53
A few state laws (e.g., Arkansas and Massachusetts) merely reinforce
the IDEA requirement by expressly prohibiting reconsideration
20 U.S.C. § 1415(h)(4) (2017) (parties’ and public’s, including SEA
advisory committees, right to “findings of fact and decision”); cf. 20 U.S.C. §§
1415(g)(1), 1415(i)(2)(A) (2017) (right to appeal “findings and decision”).
48 TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-10-606(d) (2019). “IEP” refers to the eligible
child’s individualized education program.
49 19 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 89.1185(m) (2012). Although not cited in this
Texas regulation, the language corresponds to that in 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.517(c)(4)(i),
300.517(c)(5) (2019).
50 WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.461(3) (2013); W ASH. ADMIN. CODE § 10-08210 (2020).
51 ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 4, § 52.550(o) (2019).
52 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 56507(d) (2019); T ENN. CODE ANN. § 49-10-606(e)
(2019) (mandatory); see also CONN. AGENCIES REGS. §§ 10-76h-16(b) (2015)
(permissive).
53 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(1)(A) (2017).
47
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and/or reopening. However, several others provide procedures for
clarification, correction, or reconsideration of the decision that seem
to be in tension with IDEA finality. 54 Although some of these
provisions are within special education laws,55 the majority,
especially among those for reconsideration, are in APA laws, posing
the additional possible conflict with the state’s special education
law.56
The next most frequent feature within the Decision category was
transmittal requirements (n=10).57 The prevalent addition required
transmittal to the state education agency (SEA), and some state laws
(e.g., Alabama and Colorado) required the transmission to include the
hearing record.58 Much more distinctive for this subcategory,
Delaware law mandates transmittal to the members of the district’s
school board,59 and Illinois law requires translation of the decision
into the parents’ primary language if it is other than English. 60
The two remaining features of the Decision category have
infrequent entries. Most notably, the state law additions for the

E.g., C.C. v. Beaumont Indep. Sch. Dist., 65 IDELR ¶ 109 (E.D. Tex. 2015)
(agreeing with the agency interpretation in Letter to Weiner, 57 IDELR ¶ 79
(OSEP 2011) that the IDEA does not allow reconsideration unless within the fortyfive-day period for the final decision). For the IDEA’s finality requirement, see 20
U.S.C. § 1415(i)(1)(A) (2017); see also Perry A. Zirkel, “Finality” under the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act: Its Meaning and Applications, 289
EDUC. L. REP. 27 (2013).
55 E.g., 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-802a (2018) (authorizing IHO retention of
jurisdiction for clarification, not reconsideration, within a maximum of fifteen-days
after the decision); N.M. CODE R. §§ 6.31.2.12(I)(22) (2009) (authorizing IHO to
correct errors that are clerical or “arising from oversight or omission” until judicial
appeal, which must be within ninety-days).
56 For an exception, see W ASH. ADMIN. CODE § 392-172A-05110 (2016)
(expressly overriding the APA provision for reconsideration).
57 20 U.S.C. § 1415(h)(4) (2017) (to the parties); 20 U.S.C. § 1415(h)(4)(B)
(2017) (from SEA, after redaction, to state advisory panel).
58 See COLO. CODE REGS. § 301-8:2220-R.6.02 (2013). ALA. ADMIN. CODE rr.
§§ 290-8-9-.08(9) (2019).
59 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 3110(d) (2014). Moreover, this provision extends
to requiring the school board to formally notify the parents of its receipt of the
decision, with corresponding formal notification requirements if the parents appeal
the decision. Id.
60 ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 23, § 226.670 (2007).
54
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IDEA’s FAPE limitations61 (n=3) include California’s provision for
cost as a required factor in placement cases, 62 and those for public
availability (n=3) include Delaware’s requirement for “legal notice
annually in newspapers of sufficient circulation in each of the
[state’s] three . . . counties” of the decision’s posting on the SEA
website.63
B. Appeal
In line with the IDEA’s optional review officer tier and uniform
right of appeal to state or federal court,64 the most frequent state law
addition is for judicial appeals (n=21). The vast majority of these
provisions are for the option of a limitations, or filing, period other
than the IDEA ninety-day period.65 The variations range widely
from thirty-days in a handful of states,66 with some limited to APA
provisions specific only for appeals to state courts, 67 to Virginia’s
180-days and Nebraska’s two-years for appeals to state court. 68
20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(E)(i) (2017) (requiring that IHO decisions that
determine FAPE be based “on substantive grounds”); 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(E)(ii)
(2017) (requiring for procedural violations three alternative options for denial of
FAPE, such as “deprivation of educational benefits”); 20 U.S.C. §
1415(f)(3)(E)(iii) (2017) (permitting the IHO to order procedural compliance).
62 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 56505(i) (2019).
63 14 DEL. ADMIN. CODE § 926(13.6) (2019).
64 See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(g)(1), 1415(i)(2)(A) (2017).
65 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(B) (2017) (ninety-days unless state law specifies
otherwise). For the default states, which do not clearly provide an alternative
period, the litigation has been rather extensive as to the purported substitution or
application of the ninety-day deadline. E.g., Richardson v. Omaha Sch. Dist., No.
3:17-CV-03111, 2019 WL 1930129, at *1 (8th Cir. 2020) (discussion of varying
approaches, including citations of applicable federal appellate decisions).
66 In a recent decision arising in New Mexico, which is one of the states that
has a 30-day provision in its special education regulations, the Tenth Circuit ruled
that this limitation applies equally to school district requests for attorneys’ fees as it
does for parent requests. Bd. of Educ. of Gallup-McKinley Cty. Sch. v. Native
Am. Disability Law Ctr., Inc., __ F.3d __ (10th Cir. 2020).
67 E.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13B.140 (2020); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 1-2631 (2004); cf. IDAHO ADMIN. CODE r. 04.11.01.740 (2019) (providing for twentyeight-day period, but with varying starting points due to reconsideration
procedure).
68 NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-1167(2) (2017); 8 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 20-81-210(T)
(2015). Both are special education, not APA, laws, with Nebraska’s provision not
61
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Among the minority of additions to the appeals subcategory, one
unusual provision is Illinois’ extension of school district liability for
attorneys’ fees when the district “willfully disregards applicable
regulations or statutes regarding a child [with a disability], and which
disregard has been detrimental to the child.”69 Another is New
Hampshire’s extension to liability for expert witness fees when the
parent is the prevailing party and the court also determines that the
district “has not acted in good faith in developing or implementing a
child's [IEP].”70
The additions to other appeals subcategory are limited to seven of
the eight states that currently have a second review officer level.71
Unusually, the remaining state, South Carolina, does not mention this
level in its legislation or regulations, instead addressing it in the
SEA’s guidelines, which do not have the force of law.72 The special
education laws in the other six states have relatively limited additions
for the second tier, largely focusing on one or more steps in the
overall timeline. New York is the only state with detailed procedures
for the review officer level, including, for example, provisions for
prehearing conferences, answers and cross appeals, and even the
form of pleadings and legal memoranda.73
C. Other

mentioning appeals to federal court and Virginia’s provision citing the ninety-day
IDEA provision for the federal court alternative. Id.
69 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-802a(i) (2018).
70 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §186-C:16-b (2020).
71 20 U.S.C. § 1415(g) (2017). The number of states opting for a review
officer tier has decreased from twenty-six in 1991 to eight in 2019. Supra note 9.
However, the addition in the Oklahoma regulations is limited to the Miscellaneous
other column. Oklahoma’s few other additions, particularly a thirty-day deadline
for filing an appeal to the second tier, are within an SEA guidelines document.
DUE PROCESS IN SPECIAL EDUC. GUIDELINES FOR PARENTS AND SCHOOL
ADMINISTRATORS (2010), https://sde.ok.gov/due-process.
72 S.C. ST. DEP’T OF EDUC., SPECIAL EDUC. PROCESS GUIDE 182 (2013),
https://ed.sc.gov/districts-schools/special-education-services/state-regulations/; S.C.
ST. DEP’T OF EDUC., POLICIES AND PROCEDURES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUC. IMPROVEMENT ACT 13 (2011),
https://ed.sc.gov/districts-schools/special-education-services/fiscal-and-grantsmanagement-fgm/grants/sc-policies-and-procedures-for-special-education/.
73 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8, §§ 279.1–279.14 (2020).
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The other state law additions consist of a few entries for the stay
put subcategory74 and a catch-all for the wide variety of
miscellaneous post-hearing items that did not fit in the subcategories
of the federal template. The only notable additions to the IDEA’s
stay put provision, which applies to not only the DPH, but also the
post-hearing proceedings,75 are (1) Illinois’ difficult to decipher
provision that seems to limit district liability in cases of an adverse
IHO decision76 and (2) Texas’ similarly questionable77 exception for
districts to “withhold reimbursement for past expenses ordered by the
[IHO].”78
The final catch-all subcategory commonly addresses
organizational issues, such as payment or enforcement, or specific
IHO authority, such as for post-hearing briefs (e.g., Arkansas and
Massachusetts) or particular remedies (e.g., Delaware and
Montana).79 The unusual payment provisions include the detailed

20 U.S.C. § 1415(j) (2017) (except for limited specified circumstances, “the
child shall remain in the then-current educational placement” during the
proceedings); see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.518 (2018) (adding provisions for transition
from Part C to Part B and effect of decision agreeing with parents by the IHO or, in
two-tier states, by the review officer). For a snapshot of the extensive related case
law, see Perry A. Zirkel, “Stay-Put” under the IDEA: An Updated Overview, 330
EDUC. L. REP. 8 (2016).
75 Id.
76 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-802a(j) (2018):
The costs for any special education and related services or
placement incurred following [sixty] school days after the initial
request for evaluation shall be borne by the school district if the
services or placement is in accordance with the final
determination as to the special education and related services or
placement that must be provided to the child, provided that
during that [sixty]-day period there have been no delays caused
by the child's parent.
77 The reason that any such limitations are questionable is the preemptive
effect of the well-settled understanding that an IHO’s decision for the plaintiffparents in a tuition reimbursement case in a one-tier state, such as Illinois and
Texas, serves as the stay put that triggers the tuition reimbursement remedy. 34
C.F.R. § 300.518(d) (2018) (codifying a long line of case law cited in Zirkel, supra
note 74, at 15 n.60).
78 19 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 89.1185(o) (2012).
79 See ARK. ADMIN. CODE R. § 005.18.10–10.01 (2005); MASS., HEARING
RULES FOR SPECIAL EDUC. APPS. (2019),
74
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scope for IHO billing in Mississippi,80 the impartial method in
Nevada,81 and the cap for hearing hours in Ohio.82
Within the remaining variety of miscellaneous provisions, a
cluster of states (California, Delaware, Minnesota, and New York)
explicitly address the extent to which consent decisions are
permissible.83 Even more unusual are the Montana and Virginia laws
providing for IHO accountability during the post-hearing stage, 84 and
the relative paucity of provisions clarifying the interrelationship
between state special education and APA laws. 85
III. DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
As an overarching matter, the purpose and structure of the IDEA
provide two important and intersecting considerations for assessing
the extent of procedural prescriptiveness in the state laws for the
www.mass.gov/anf/docs/dala/bsea/hearing-rules.doc; MONT. ADMIN. R.
10.16.3523 (2015); 14 DEL. ADMIN. CODE § 926 (2019).
80 7-74 MISS. CODE R. § 74.5 (2017) (enumerating billable hours and expenses
as well as warning of unallowable items).
81 NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 388.310(14) (2019) (requiring “a method that avoids a
conflict of interest or the appearance thereof”).
82 OHIO ADMIN. CODE 3301-51-05(K)(16)(d) (2019) (specifying rebuttable
maximum of fifty-hours at a rate “not higher than that established for special
counsel for the state of Ohio”).
83 At least part of the underlying significance is the extent that the IHO’s
imprimatur is a necessary ingredient of prevailing party status to recover attorneys’
fees. E.g., V.G. v. Auburn Enlarged Cent. Sch. Dist., 349 F. App’x 582 (2d Cir.
2009).
84 MONT. ADMIN. R. 10.16.3523(2) (2015) (authorizing replacement of IHO
upon failure to issue the decision within ninety-days of the filing date); 8 VA.
ADMIN. CODE § 20-81-210(D)(3) (2015) (identifying among the factors for IHO
recertification “failing to render decision within regulatory time frames” and
“issuing a decision that contains: (a) [i]naccurate appeal rights of the parents; or (b)
[n]o controlling case or statutory authority to support the findings”).
85 E.g., 603 MASS. CODE REGS. 28.08(5) (2020) (applying the APA
adjudicatory regulations “[e]xcept as provided otherwise under federal law or in the
administrative rules adopted by [the office of the special education ALJs]”); MICH.
ADMIN. CODE R. 792.1010 (2018) (excepting “[i]f a statute prescribes a procedure
that conflicts with these [APA] rules”); MO. REV. STAT. § 162.961 (2018)
(establishing preemptive effect of “requirements of the [IDEA]”); OR. ADMIN. R.
581-15-2340(2) (2017) (incorporating the APA adjudicatory provisions “to the
extent consistent with federal law”); W IS. STAT. § 115.80(10) (2017) (exempting
ALJs in IDEA DPHs from the APA adjudicatory provisions).
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impartial hearing process, here focused on the post-hearing stage.
First, the IDEA follows the aforementioned model of “cooperative
federalism.”86 Specifically, for the post-hearing process, the Act and
its regulations provide a rather minimalistic skeletal structure 87 that
expressly includes state variation88 and that clearly leaves wide
latitude for either codified additions or purposeful flexibility. For the
codified alternative, the prescriptions could be the judicialized
general model of the APA or a less formal procedural approach
customized to the IDEA.
Second, specific to its provision for an administrative hearing
prior to any judicial action, the IDEA evidences a purpose of prompt
dispute resolution.89 The legislative history of the Act supports this
inference in light of the individual interest of the student with
disabilities for timely identification and services. 90 This intent also
aligns with the societal interest in judicial economy and the school
Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 52 (2005) (citing Little Rock Sch. Dist. v.
Mauney, 183 F.3d 816, 830 (9th Cir. 1999)).
87 This structure serves as the template for this analysis. 20 U.S.C. § 1415
(2017); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.514(b)(2)(i)–(vi), 300.515(b), 300.518 (2018); supra
notes 16–35 and accompanying text.
88 The two features within this template are the options for a second, review
tier and for a shorter or longer limitations period for judicial appeal. 20 U.S.C. §§
1415(g), 1415(i)(2)(B) (2017).
89 E.g., Amann v. Stow, 991 F.2d 929, 932 (1st Cir. 1993) (citing Spiegler v.
D.C., 866 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Adler v. Educ. Dep’t of N.Y., 760 F.2d 454
(2d Cir. 1985); Bow Sch. Dist. v. Quentin W., 750 F. Supp. 546 (D.N.H. 1990)
(“The legislative history, statutory terms, and regulatory framework of the IDEA
[that] all emphasize promptness as an indispensable element of the statutory
scheme”).
90 E.g., The principal sponsor of the legislation stated the following:
I cannot emphasize enough that delay in resolving matters
regarding the education program of a handicapped child is
extremely detrimental to his development. The interruption or
lack of the required special education and related services can
result in a substantial setback to the child's development. Thus,
in view of the urgent need for prompt resolution of questions
involving the education of handicapped children it is expected
that all hearings and reviews conducted pursuant to these
provisions will be commenced and disposed of as quickly as
practicable consistent with fair consideration of the issues
involved.
121 CONG. REC. 37, 416 (1975) (statements of Sen. Harrison Williams).
86
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district’s interest in focusing its limited resources, including the time
of personnel as well as the allocations of its budget, on educational
outcomes rather than transaction costs. The courts are congested and
slow such that the IDEA provision for judicial review, after the
required exhaustion,91 still amounts to a ponderous process,92 even
without additional fact finding being necessary in most cases. 93 The
regulatory timeline of forty-five-days recognizes and reinforces this
interest in prompt adjudication.94
Examination of the entries in the Appendix in relation to these
two intersecting considerations reveals less prescriptiveness for the
post-hearing stage than for the hearing stage. More specifically, the
Table here consists of nine specific features, with an average of
twelve entries for each of these columns, whereas the corresponding
Table for the hearing stage95 consisted of twelve specific features,
with an average of twenty entries per column. This moderate
difference is likely attributable to the central priority at the hearing
stage.

91 E.g., Louis Wasserman, Delineating Administrative Exhaustion
Requirements and Establishing Federal Courts' Jurisdiction under the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act, 29 J. NAT’L ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 349 (2009).
92 Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 322 (1985); Burlington Sch. Comm. v. Mass.
Dep't of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 370 (1985) (observing that “administrative and
judicial review under the [IDEA] is often “ponderous”); see also Perry A. Zirkel,
Autism Litigation under the IDEA: A New Meaning of “Disproportionality”?, 24 J.
SPECIAL EDUC. LEADERSHIP 92, 94 (2011) (finding the average duration from the
date of filing for the hearing to the date of the final judicial decision for appealed
cases to be 2.8 years for a sample of 201 autism decisions under the IDEA).
93 See, e.g., Andriy Krahmal et al., “Additional Evidence” under the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act: The Need for Rigor, 9 TEX. J. CIV.
RTS. & CIV. LIBERTIES 201 (2004) (identifying the benefits of a uniform and
rigorous approach to IDEA option for courts to take additional evidence upon
judicial review).
94 34 C.F.R. § 300.515(a) (2018). This time period may be extended by (1) a
thirty-day prior period for the resolution process for parental filings (34 C.F.R. §
300.510 (2018)), (2) a thirty-day period for the states with a second tier (34 C.F.R.
§ 300.515(b) (2018)), and (2) specific extensions granted by the hearing or review
officer (34 C.F.R. § 300.515(c) (2018)).
95 Zirkel, supra note 2, at 13–16.
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Nevertheless, the entries for the post-hearing stage reflect a
similar “proceduralization”96 that tends to be the result of the gradual
trend of judicialization of the overall IDEA hearing process. 97 This
trend correlates significantly (but not at all entirely) with the overlay
of APA laws, which now apply to IDEA hearings in almost half of
the states,98 and which generally are associated with the use of central
panel ALJs.99 The application of APA laws presents the problem of
generic proceduralism100 that contributes to the belated completion of

E.g., David Kirp, William Buss, & Peter Kuriloff, Legal Reform of Special
Education: Empirical Studies and Procedural Proposals, 62 CAL. L. REV. 40, 154
(1974) (providing a qualifying caution about “proceduralization” during the
formulation of the IDEA model).
97 E.g., Perry A. Zirkel et al., Creeping Judicialization in Special Education
Hearings?: An Exploratory Study, 27 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 1
(2007) (finding various indicators of increasing judicialization in an empirical
analysis of IHO decisions in Iowa). Another indicator, which is evident across the
states, is the gradual shift from attorneys being a minority of IHOs to attorneys
being the vast majority of IHOs. Compare Thomas Smith, Status of Due Process
Hearings, 48 EXCEPTIONAL CHILD. 232, 233 (1981) (finding that 55% of the IHOs
were non-lawyers with inferable expertise in special education), with Connolly et
al., supra note 9, at 159 (finding that in forty-one states and D.C. 100% of the IHOs
were lawyers, and the only state where less than a majority were lawyers was
Delaware, which uses a tripartite panel with the attorney in the central position).
Moreover, early models of part-time IHOs had changed to full-time IHOs in
approximately nineteen states. Id. at 158. As a result, the competence criteria for
IHOs, established for the first time in the 2004 amendments of the IDEA, focused
on legal rather than special education practice. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(f)(3)(A)(ii)–(iv)
(2017) (detailing knowledge and ability for IDEA legal interpretations, conducting
hearings, and writing decisions).
98 Supra Table and infra Appendix. As indicated by the asterisked notes, a few
states have distinct variations with regard to the incorporation of APA laws.
Conversely and unusually, Wisconsin uses full-time ALJs but expressly excludes
applying its APA. WIS. STAT. § 115.80(10) (2017).
99 Connolly et al., supra note 9, at 158 (found increase to use of central panels
in twenty states). However, the intersecting finding for “full-time” IHOs was
imprecise because the central panel ALJs are full-time, but in most of these states
not specifically for IDEA cases. Id. at 96. In contrast, Massachusetts has a subunit
specific to IDEA (and Section 504) cases. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 71B, § 2A
(2020).
100 E.g., Perry A. Zirkel, The Over-Legalization of Special Education, 195
EDUC. L. REP. 35, 35 (2005) (pointing out the reduced basis for procedural due
process after the implementation of the IDEA); Perry A. Zirkel, Over-Due Process
96
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DPHs101 and that causes confusion or conflict when not customized
for the IDEA. For example, consider within the most frequent
column in the Decision category of the Table (“other required
contents”) the overly prescriptive entries for both New Jersey and
Oregon and the conflicting entry for North Carolina.102 For other
examples, see the APA-based entries for a recommended decision
stage in Florida, Kentucky and North Dakota.103
For a
reconsideration step, see the states including Hawaii, Oregon, and
Tennessee104 that, if not customized,105 all represent potential conflict
with the aforementioned106 finality requirement of the IDEA. The
resulting confusion, particularly upon losing sight of the expedited
purpose of IDEA hearings,107 can lead to costly litigation. For
example, the Second Circuit rejected the plaintiff-parents’ contention
that the state’s incorporated APA forty-five-day filing deadline for
appeals to state court did not apply to IDEA appeals to federal court,
concluding that this generic application conflicted with Congress’s
intent for “expedient resolution of [IDEA] claims.”108
Revisions for the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 55 MONT. L. REV.
403, 404 (1994) (observing the undue proceduralism of DPHs under the IDEA).
101 Although the average length of time of DPHs from filing to decision is not
nationally available, the data that the U.S. Department of Education collects
annually shows that the vast majority of IHO decisions were not within the fortyfive-day timeline. E-mail from Diana Cruz, Data Analyst, Nat’l Center for
Appropriate Dispute Resolution in Special Educ., to Perry A. Zirkel, Univ.
Professor Emeritus of Educ. & Law, Lehigh Univ. (Nov. 12, 2019 10:50 EST)
(67% in 2004-05, 78% in 2005-06, 76% in 2006-07, 73% in 2007-08, 76% in
2008-09, 71% in 2009-10, 76% in 2010-11, 79% in 2011-12, 80% in 2012-13, 82%
in 2013-14, 74% in 2014-15, 74% in 2015-16, 77% in 2016-17, and 80% in 201718).
102 Supra Table, at column D. Yet, this procedural problem is not limited to
APA laws, as the corresponding entries for the special education laws in Alabama
and Nebraska illustrate.
103 Id. at column D.
104 Id. at column G.
105 WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 392-172A-05110 (2016). For clarifying preemption
more generally, see the entries for Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, and Oregon
in column K. Supra Table, at column K.
106 Supra note 54 and accompanying text. Again, the problem is not exclusive
to APA laws, as the New Mexico entry for column G illustrates.
107 Supra notes 89–94 and accompanying text.
108 P.M.B. v. Ridgefield Bd. of Educ., 944 F.3d 473, 477 (2d Cir. 2019).

24

JOURNAL OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDICIARY

40-1

The problems of ill-fitting, undue due process are not entirely
limited to APA laws,109 which for some states do not provide any
post-hearing additions to the federal template.110 Conversely, other
states with pertinent APA laws clarify the superseding effect of the
state’s special education laws.111 Moreover, the state special
education laws that provide customized applicable entries fostering
prompt final decisions merit special attention.112 Similarly, in line
with the experimentation benefit of federalism,113 states should
consider the potential value of state law provisions at the posthearing stage for IHO accountability,114 expert witness fees
awards,115 translated decisions,116 and impartial payment
procedures.117
As an overall matter, this snapshot of the post-hearing stage, like
the recent one of the hearing stage,118 reflects the Janus-like trade-off
between the benefits of “legalization” and the costs of “the arid
formality of legalism.”119 More specifically, in assessing the results
109 The states cited by way of contrast serve as the relatively limited examples.
Supra notes 102 and 106.
110 Supra Table – Colorado, Louisiana, Maryland, and Minnesota.
111 Supra Table, at column G.
112 19 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 89.1185(m) (2012), OHIO ADMIN. CODE 3301-5105(K)(16)(d) (2019), and, less specifically, 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-802a(i)
(2018).
113 E.g., McDonald v. City of Chi., 561 U.S. 742, 783 (2010) (“the values of
federalism and state experimentation”); AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S.
366, 418 (1999) (“‘experimentation’ long thought a strength of our federal
system”); EEOC v. Wyo., 460 U.S. 226, 264–65 (1983) (“Flexibility for
experimentation not only permits each state to find the best solutions to its own
problems, it is the means by which each state may profit from the experiences and
activities of all the rest”) (J. Burger, dissenting).
114 MONT. ADMIN. R. 10.16.3523(2) (2015); 8 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 20-81210(D)(3) (2015).
115 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §186-C:16-b (2020).
116 ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 23, § 226.670 (2020).
117 NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 388.310(14) (2019) (requiring “a method that avoids
a conflict of interest or the appearance thereof”).
118 Zirkel, supra note 2, at 26–27.
119 David Neal & David L. Kirp, The Allure of Legalization: The Case of
Special Education Reconsidered, 48 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 82 (1985)
(observing that “this [Janus-like] duality of the legal model plays out in the special
education area”).
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of this systematic analysis, the key is to retain the benefits of the
judicialization of DPHs,120 but with careful customization of the
structure and purpose of the IDEA.
Finally, given the “two worlds” of DPHs under the IDEA, 121 the
handful of states, led by New York, that account for the vast majority
of the adjudicated hearings,122 should lead the way in reviewing these
results and refining their laws for appropriate efficiency. 123 This
review and revision process should simultaneously consider the
recent analysis of the hearing stage124 and the upcoming analysis of
the prehearing stage.125

Supra note 97 and accompanying text.
Perry A. Zirkel, Trends in Impartial Hearings under the IDEA, 302 EDUC.
L. REP. 1, 2 (2014).
122 Id. (finding for the period, 2006–2011, that five of the fifty states—New
York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, California, and Maryland—accounted for 80% of
the adjudicated hearings); see also Perry A. Zirkel, Trends in Impartial Hearings
under the IDEA: A Follow-Up Analysis, 303 EDUC. L. REP. 1, 10–12 (2014)
(finding that for the same period New York accounted for more adjudicated
hearings than all of the other states, thus not counting the District of Columbia and
Puerto Rico).
123 Accompanied by the adjective “appropriate,” which is the hallmark of the
IDEA “efficiency” here is specialized or customized rather than the generic
benefits of a centralized system of administrative adjudication. E.g., Endrew F. v.
Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 137 S. Ct. 988, 999 (2017); Malcolm C. Rich & Alison C.
Goldstein, The Need for a Central Panel Approach to Administrative Adjudication:
Pros, Cons, and Selected Practices, 39 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 1, 24–
25 (2019).
124 Zirkel, supra note 2.
125 Andrew Lee & Perry A. Zirkel, State Laws for Due Process Hearings under
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act III: The Prehearing Stage, J. NAT’L
ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY (forthcoming).
120
121
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Special Education Laws
AL
AK
AZ*

AR
CA*

ALA. ADMIN. CODE rr. §§ 290-8-9.08(9)(c)(12)(iv), 290-8-9-.08(9)(c)(16) (2019).
ALASKA STAT. § 14.30.193(f) (2008); ALASKA
ADMIN. CODE tit. 4, § 52.550(m)–(p) (2019).
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 15-766(F) (2017); ARIZ.
ADMIN. CODE § R7-2-405(H)(6)–(8) (2010).

ARK. ADMIN. CODE R. §§ 005.18.10–10.01.22.9, 10.01.33.2., -10.01.39.2 – .39.5 (2005).
CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 56505(i), 56507(d) (2019);
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 5, §§ 3085, 3087 (2014).

COLO. CODE REGS. § 301-8:2220-R.6.02(7.5)(h)
(2013).
CT** CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-76h(d)–(e) (2012); CONN.
AGENCIES REGS. §§ 10-76h-16 (2015).

40-1

General
Administrative
Hearing Laws

ARIZ. REV.
STAT. §§ 411092.07(F)(6)–
(7), 411092.08(A)
(2017).
CAL. CODE
REGS. tit. 1, §
1048 (2014).

CO*

DE
FL*

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 3110 (2014); 14 DEL.
ADMIN. CODE § 926(13.6) (2019).
FLA. STAT. § 1003.57(1)(c) (2017); FLA. ADMIN.
CODE r. 6A-6.03311(9)(v) (2014).

GA*
HI*

ID*

IDAHO ADMIN. CODE r. 08.02.03.004 (2019) ;
DEP’T OF SPECIAL EDUC.: SPECIAL EDUC. MANUEL

CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 4-183
(2012).**
FLA. ADMIN.
CODE rr. 28106.215 – 28106.217 (2014).
GA. COMP. R.
& REGS. 616-12-.27 (2010).
HAW. CODE R.
§§ 16-201-22 –
16-201-23
(2008).
IDAHO ADMIN.
CODE rr.
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IN*

(2018),
http://www.sde.idaho.gov/sped/files/shared/IdahoSpecial-Education-Manual-2018-Final.pdf.
105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-802a (2018); ILL.
ADMIN. CODE tit. 23, § 226.670 (2020).
511 IND. ADMIN. CODE 7-45-7 (2018).

IA*

IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 281.41.1013 (2018).

KS

KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 72-3416, 72-3418, 72-3419
(2017).
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 157.224 (2020); 707 KY.
ADMIN. REGS. 1:340 (2018).

IL

KY*

LA*
ME
MD*
MA*

MI*

MN*
MS
MO*

LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 28, Pt. XLIII, § 514 (2017).
05-071-101 ME. CODE R. § XVI(7)–(14) (2017).
MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 8-413 (2018).
603 MASS. CODE REGS. 28.08(5) (2020);
MASS., HEARING RULES FOR SPECIAL EDUC. APPS.
(2019),
www.mass.gov/anf/docs/dala/bsea/hearingrules.doc.
MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 340.1724f (2018).

MINN. STAT. § 125A.091 (2019); M INN. R.
3525.4420, 3525.4700 (2018).
7-74 MISS. CODE Pt. 3, R. § 74.5 (2017).
MO. REV. STAT. §§ 162.961 & 621.253 (2018).
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04.11.01.740 &
04.11.01.770
(2019).
IND. CODE §§
4-21.5-3-27 &
4-21.5-3-31
(2011).
IOWA ADMIN.
CODE r.
481.10.24
(2018).
KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§
13B.110 –
13B.140
(2020).

MASS. GEN.
LAWS ch. 30A,
§ 11 (2018).
MICH. ADMIN.
CODE rr.
792.1010 &
2792.10133 –
792.10137
(2018).

MO. REV. STAT.
§§ 621.135,
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621.255 &
536.090 (2018).
MT
NE
NV
NH*
*
NJ*
NM
NY
NC*
ND*

OH
OK
OR*

PA
RI
SC
SD*

MONT. ADMIN. R. 10.16.3523 (2015).
NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-1167 (2017); 92 NEB.
ADMIN. CODE §§ 55-.008 – 55-.009 (2017).
NEV. ADMIN. CODE §§ 388.310, 388.315 (2019).
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §186-C:16-b (2020); N.H.
CODE ADMIN R. EDUC. §§ 1123.18, 1123.22
(2020).

N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. §
541-A:35
(2020).**
N.J. REV. STAT. § 18A:36-1.2 (2014); N.J. ADMIN. N.J. ADMIN.
CODE § 6A:14-2.7 (2020).
CODE § 1:118.3 (2009).
N.M. CODE R. § 6.31.2.12(I)(22)-(23) (2009).
N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 4404 (2007); N.Y. COMP.
CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8, §§ 200.5(j) – 200.5(k),
279.1 – 279.14 (2020).
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 115C-109.6(f), 115C-109.9
26 N.C. ADMIN.
(2019).
CODE 3.0127
(2020).
N.D. ADMIN. CODE 67-23-05-02 (2016).
N.D. ADMIN.
CODE 98-0204-01, 98-0204-06 –
98-02-04-07
(2016).
OHIO ADMIN. CODE 3301-51-05(K)(14)–(16)
(2019).
OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 210:05-13.5 (2020).
OR. ADMIN. R. 581-15-2340 (2017).
OR. ADMIN. R.
137-003-0645 –
137-003-0675
(2017).
PA. CODE § 14.162(f) (1990).

S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS §§ 1-26-
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TN*

TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-10-606 (2019); TENN.
COMP. R. & REGS. 0520-01-09-18 (2008).

TX
UT
VT
VA*
**

19 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 89.1185 (2012).
UTAH CODE ANN. § 53E-7-208 (2019).

WA*

WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 392-172A-05095 & 392172A-05110.

WV

W. VA. CODE R. § 126-16-3 (2020);
http://wvde.state.wv.us/osp/Policy2419_2017.pdf.
WIS. STAT. § 115.80 (2017).
7 WYO. CODE R. § 7 (2019).

WI
WY

VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-214 (2019); 8 VA. CODE
ADMIN. § 20-81-210 (2015).
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25, 1-26-31
(2019).
TENN. CODE
ANN. §§ 4-5314, 4-5-317
(2019).

www.courts.sta
te.va.us/progra
ms/ho/rules_of
_admin_1.pdf*
**
WASH. REV.
CODE §§
34.05.461,
34.05.470
(2013); WASH.
ADMIN. CODE
§§ 10-08-210,
10-08-215
(2020).

* Designates states that have APA legislation or regulations that, in
addition to special education-specific laws, apply to IDEA DPHs; however,
the row for such states is blank when the APA provisions do not account for
any additions to the post-hearing stage.
** Designates the converse situation in which the state’s APA does not
apply to IDEA DPHs generally, but a particular APA provision for the posthearing stage is incorporated by cross-referencing in the state’s special
education law.
*** Designates special situation of incorporation of Supreme Court
rules of administration, which the SEA interprets as not importing the rest
of the APA.

